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This paper studies monetary policy in models where multiple assets
have different liquidity properties: safe and “pseudo-safe” assets
coexist. A shock worsening the liquidity properties of the pseudo-
safe assets raises interest-rate spreads and can cause a deep reces-
sion cum deflation. Expanding the central bank’s balance sheet fills
the shortage of safe assets and counteracts the recession. Lowering
the interest rate on reserves insulates market interest rates from
the liquidity shock and improves risk sharing between borrowers
and savers.
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This paper presents monetary models in which multiple assets have different
liquidity properties and studies the propagation mechanism of a shock that de-
teriorates the quality of some assets, in line with what has been observed at the
onset of the US financial crisis.1 In our framework there are some safe assets,
such as money, which can be perfect store of value and immediately resaleable,
and other assets, labelled “pseudo-safe” or “pseudo-liquid” assets, which are also
perfect store of value but might instead have imperfect liquidity properties that
can vary over time.2
Our framework shows that a liquidity shock can imply, if monetary policy is
non-responsive, significant effects on the economy along two main dimensions.
First, the overall shortage of liquidity implies a corresponding shortage of de-
mand for goods since fewer assets remain available for goods purchasing.3 The
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1More recently, on April 2015, a shortage of high-quality bonds created disruption in the U.S. repos
market creating bottlenecks for a key source of liquidity in the financial system.
2See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gorton et al. (2010) for a discussion on how market
liquidity can suddenly dry up.
3The mirror image of a disequilibrium in the financial market is a disequilibrium in the goods market,
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consequent contraction in nominal spending can depress real activity in the pres-
ence of nominal rigidities causing a deep recession cum deflation. Second, the
liquidity shock raises the premium required to hold pseudo-safe assets. The fund-
ing costs for intermediaries, which borrow in the pseudo-safe assets, increase and
at the same time force them to charge higher interest rates on loans. Due to rising
borrowing costs, debtors need to cut on their spending, amplifying the contrac-
tion in the real economy with important distributional effects between savers and
borrowers.
Monetary policy has an important role in mitigating the adverse effects on the
economy along the two transmission mechanisms underlined above. First, the
central bank can heal the shortage of safe assets and prevent the contraction in
nominal spending by issuing more money, which remains a perfectly safe asset
in circulation. The expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet is necessary to
maintain price stability. Second, monetary policy can insulate the interest rates
on the pseudo-safe assets from the liquidity shock, by lowering the interest rate
on reserves and therefore improving risk sharing between borrowers and savers.
For a large shock, the zero-lower bound can be an important constraint along this
dimension.
A policy in which the interest rate on reserves is lowered, while the balance
sheet of the central bank is not expanded, does not prevent the contraction in
nominal spending. As well, a policy in which more liquidity is injected into the
system, but the policy rate is not lowered, can only partially contain the rise
in the liquidity premia and the distributional costs of the liquidity shock. It is
important to note that the two policy prescriptions coming out of our model do
not depend on the degree of nominal rigidities. In particular nominal spending is
the key variable to stabilize in the face of a liquidity shock, as frequently discussed
in the recent public debate.4
Our analysis is complementary to a recent literature that has provided possible
explanations of the macroeconomic adjustment following the recent crises. Com-
pared to Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012),
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Guerrieri and Loren-
zoni (2011), we focus on different forces for understanding financial crises.5
To gauge the difference between our model and theirs, let ibt the interest rate
at which intermediaries lend, while idt is their funding or deposit rate; i
m
t is the
policy rate. In Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) the main shock hits directly the credit spread
ibt − idt by raising the interest rate on loans and lowering the deposit rate which,
in their models, is equivalent to the risk-free rate imt . The consequent reduction
in credit flows causes the recession.
The key spread in our framework is instead between the deposit and the policy
as often discussed in commentaries of the crisis, such as Lucas (2008) and De Long (2010), bringing out
ideas that go back to Mill (1829).
4See, among others, Woodford (2012).
5Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013) analyzes the quantitative implications of such models.
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rate, idt − imt , which critically depends on the liquidity properties of deposits
relative to money.6 A liquidity shock worsening the quality of deposits raises this
spread which is then passed through into higher lending rates. The deposit rate
increases in our model rather than falling as in the literature. Most important, we
emphasize an additional and new channel of transmission: the shortage of assets
available to purchase goods creates a contraction in aggregate demand driving
the economy into a recession.
The different source of shock originating the crisis enables us to rationalize as
optimal policies the main monetary policy actions adopted during the recent crisis
such as balance-sheet and zero-lower-bound policies focusing on different forces
than those underlined by the literature above.
First, zero-lower bound policies are also optimal in our context, but for different
reasons. Lowering the policy rate is the way to insulate the market real rates from
the liquidity shock and achieve a better risk-sharing of consumption between
borrowers and savers. In Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012), instead, they are necessary to accommodate as much as possible
the required fall in real rates and to avoid a deep contraction in aggregate output.
In contrast, in our model, the recession is not averted at all by zero lower bound
policies.
Second, we also emphasize the need of expansionary policies on central-bank
balance sheet, but again for different reasons. In the literature they act directly
on credit spreads, as discussed in Curdia and Woodford (2010, 2011), Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Here, instead, unconventional
policies should be primarily focused to heal the shortage of safe assets since this is
the source of the fall in aggregate demand and of the ensuing recession. Without
this intervention, the macroeconomic consequences of the crisis cannot be avoided.
To this end, our analysis shows that it is not sufficient to intervene in the financial
markets and reduce credit or liquidity spreads. Instead, safe assets should be
supplied as needed to maintain a stable nominal spending.7
Our approach to model liquidity is in line with that of Lagos (2010), where
financial assets are valued for the degree to which they are useful in exchange
for goods. In his model, agents are free to choose which assets to use as means
of payment, between bonds and equity shares. However, he also restricts the
analysis to cases in which bonds are assumed to be superior to equity shares for
liquidity purposes.8 The finance constraint in our model, through which goods
and assets are exchanged, is of a simple form in line with the works of Lucas
6In Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) the deposit rate can also differ from the risk-free rate but in an
idiosyncratic way across intermediaries participating to the interbank market.
7Our analysis does not aim at explaining all features of the financial crisis and the consequent slow
recovery. But it might suggest that a delayed monetary-policy reaction to a sudden deterioration in the
liquidity properties of some assets could have produced real effects and additional financial consequences.
Indeed the crisis started in July 2007 and the Fed begun its balance-sheet expansion and zero-lower bound
policies only at the end of 2008.
8In Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), instead, transaction costs in trading equities are responsible for a
lower degree of liquidity of the latter with respect to bonds.
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(1982), Svensson (1985) and Townsend (1987). The way we characterize a liquid-
ity shock, as a change in the degree of resaleability of assets, is close to Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012).9 In their model, entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint to
finance investment and they need to use internal resources among which money
and previous holdings of equity. Equity can be used only in part to finance invest-
ment, where the fraction available is known at the time when liquidity is needed.
Instead, we model the exchange of assets for goods at the level of consumption.
The shortcut taken here has the benefit of producing a highly tractable model
of the role of liquidity, which extends standard monetary models currently used
for the analysis of monetary policy. Moreover, the partial resaleability of Lagos
(2010) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) concerns a risky asset like equity and
not risk-free assets as in our model. Finally, Trani (2012) is an example of an
open-economy model in which multiple assets (equities) provide collateral services
with time-varying properties specific to each asset, and therefore have different
liquidity premia.
In monetary analysis, several works have introduced a transaction role for
bonds, although an indirect one. In Canzoneri and Diba (2005), current in-
come can also be used for liquidity purposes in a fraction that depends on the
quantity of bonds held in the portfolio. In their model, bonds have indirect liq-
uidity services since they enhance the fraction of income used to purchase goods.
Woodford (1991) is an early example of a model in which current income has
immediate liquidity value but bonds do not provide liquidity services. In our con-
text, a liquidity constraint disciplines literally the exchange of assets for goods and
the imperfect substitutability of pseudo-safe assets for money through a random
factor. In Belongia and Ireland (2006, 2012), money and deposits are bundled
together through a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, and can be used for liquidity pur-
poses as in the work of Canzoneri et al. (2011) where bonds are instead imperfect
substitutes for money. Canzoneri et al. (2008) consider instead a model in which
bonds provide direct utility to the consumer. These latter works are not con-
cerned with variation over time of the liquidity properties of assets. Finally Benk
et al. (2010) present a model in which money and credit services can both provide
liquidity services to study movements in the U.S. velocity of money.
Another important feature of our model is that we allow the central bank to pay
an interest rate on reserves. This is key to give monetary policy two instruments,
rather than the sole of the literature, to counteract at the same time the fall in the
supply of liquid assets and the distributional consequences of the rising spread
in financial markets. Kashyap and Stein (2012) and Canzoneri et al. (2015)
are examples of other works in which reserves pay an interest rate. The dual
monetary-policy instruments can be used to achieve macroeconomic and financial
stability objectives. However, in their case, the role of interest rate on reserves is
9Del Negro et al. (2012) estimate a quantitative version of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) with nominal
rigidities to describe the US financial crisis. Within a different framework, their result supports our
policy prescriptions. Chiesa (2013) presents also a model in which liquidity holdings are an input to the
investment process and assets have different degrees of pledgeability.
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for macro-prudential purposes rather than a tool useful to react to the surge of a
liquidity crisis.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I presents the framework in which
liquidity and pseudo-safe assets are introduced. It discusses a simple monetary
model with flexible prices. In Section II the propagation of liquidity shocks is
analyzed depending on alternative monetary policy regimes. Section III analyzes
a monetary model with heterogenous agents (savers and borrowers) where an
inside asset plays the role of a pseudo-safe security. Section IV uses the general
model to study the macroeconomic implications of a liquidity shock and the role
of monetary policy. Section V concludes.
I. A simple model with pseudo-safe assets
We model liquidity as the resaleability of an asset in exchange for consumption
goods. Several assets can be brought to buy goods, but they have different liq-
uidity properties which can be discovered only at the time of purchasing. In the
goods market, the portfolio of assets cannot be rebalanced nor new assets can be
traded. The following liquidity constraint applies
(1)
N∑
j=1
γt(j)(1 + it−1(j))Bt−1(j) ≥ PtCt
where N assets are available and Bt−1(j) is the value of asset j, in units of
currency, held in the agent’s portfolio. At the time of purchasing goods, each
security matures already a predetermined nominal interest rate, specific to the
asset and given by (1 + it−1(j)); Pt is the nominal price index while Ct is real
consumption. Securities differ for their liquidity properties which are only known
when they are exchanged for goods: γt(j) indicates literally the fraction of assets
held from previous period that can be used to purchase goods, with 0 ≤ γt(j) ≤ 1.
Assets can be ordered from the worst to the best in terms of liquidity properties
assuming that γt(j) is a non-decreasing function of j. In this set of assets, money
may have the role of the best security for liquidity purposes, meaning γt = 1.
10
Constraint (1) is in the spirit of Barnett (1980)’s view that monetary aggregates
should not only include money but also other assets weighted for their relative
liquidity properties.
Liquidity in this model can have a dual interpretation. On the one hand, it can
simply capture the degree of “acceptance” of an asset in exchange for goods. We
could think of a consumer who goes to the goods market and discovers that, among
all the securities that he has carried along, only a fraction is accepted to buy
goods. On the other hand, it could simply refer to the fraction of securities which
can be fully mobilized and exchanged for goods. In line with this interpretation,
10This might not be the case in an imperfectly credible fiat-money system.
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it can capture the intrinsic liquidity of the asset or a sort of delay in payment.
To this end, we can think of these assets as the corresponding liabilities of some
other agent, not modeled, that can be liquidated only in part at the exact time in
which the creditor needs to purchase goods. There is a subtle difference between
the two interpretations. In the first case, liquidity is a property that the “market”
(seen from the perspective of who is offering goods) attributes to the asset. This
property might have to do with the trust in the security as a medium of exchange.
In the second case, it is an intrinsic property of the asset, although it can vary
over time. Mixed interpretations could be given since the distinction is really
subtle: indeed illiquidity at the origin can also be correlated with a low degree of
acceptance of the asset at destination or viceversa.
In any case, all the securities traded in this model are perfect store of value; γt
captures just liquidity risk, and not credit risk. By this virtue, all securities are
remunerated at their specific predetermined nominal interest rate. The remaining
fraction (1− γt(j)) – which cannot be used as liquidity – remains in the financial
account becoming immediately available just after goods purchasing.
Money, the security with γt = 1, is the safe asset. Here safeness has a double
meaning. First, it captures the property of an asset as a perfect store of value.
In this model all assets share this property because each is remunerated at its
specific risk-free nominal interest rate.11 On top of this, the safe asset is fully
liquid because it can always be accepted or mobilized to purchase goods. The
other assets, with γt(j) < 1, are imperfect substitutes as means of exchange and
can be labelled “pseudo”-safe or “pseudo”-liquid assets.
Following goods purchasing, the financial market opens and consumers reallo-
cate their portfolio according to the following constraint
N∑
j=1
Bt(j) =
N∑
j=1
(1−γt(j))(1+it−1(j))Bt−1(j)+PtYt+Tt+
 N∑
j=1
γt(j)(1 + it−1(j))Bt−1(j)− PtCt]

where Yt is exogenous output and Tt are transfers from the central bank or gov-
ernment. In the above constraint it is clear that the assets which are not carried
in the goods market or are unspent remain in the financial account.
Given the above general framework, we start our analysis from a simple model
in which there are two outside assets, money and government bonds, which can
provide liquidity services. Later we develop a model with inside assets.
Consider a closed economy with a representative agent maximizing the expected
11We could easily amend this assumption by allowing for default risk. However, the purpose of this
paper is to analyze the effects of the change in the liquidity properties of assets which do not necessarily
materialize in a credit event.
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discounted value of utility
(2) Et0
+∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Ct)
where Et is the conditional expectation operator, β is the intertemporal discount
factor with 0 < β < 1; U(·) is the utility flow which is a function of current
consumption, C, and has standard properties.
At the end of a generic period t − 1, the representative agent invests Mt−1 in
money and Bt−1 in bonds. At the beginning of the next period t, money and
bonds mature their nominal interest rates, given respectively by (1 + imt−1) and
(1 + it−1), which are both predetermined. At this time, both assets can be used
to purchase goods, according to the following liquidity constraint
(3) (1 + imt−1)Mt−1 + γt(1 + it−1)Bt−1 ≥ PtCt,
where Pt is the price level. Since γt lies in the interval [0, 1], bonds are an imperfect
substitute for money for purchasing purposes. As discussed above, γt is a measure
of the degree of resaleability of bonds for goods when liquidity is needed.
After the goods market closes, the representative agent receives a stochastic
endowment Yt and transfers Tt from the government and, together with the un-
spent money and bonds, reallocates its overall wealth into new money and bonds
to be carried over in the next period. The financial portfolio adjusts according to
the following constraint
Mt+Bt ≤ (1−γt)(1+it−1)Bt−1+PtYt+Tt+[(1+imt−1)Mt−1+γt(1+it−1)Bt−1−PtCt]
where Mt and Bt denote the holdings of money and bonds to carry in the next-
period goods market. Since the endowment and the transfer are given to the agent
after the goods market closes, they both have to be turned into either money or
bond holdings, to be used for transactions purposes in the next period. The
term in the square bracket captures the residual holdings of assets after goods
purchases. It should be noted that the fraction (1 − γt) of bonds, which cannot
be used for transaction purposes, still remains in the financial account and is
available for asset trading when the financial markets open. The above constraint
simplifies to
(4) PtCt +Mt +Bt ≤ (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (1 + imt−1)Mt−1 + PtYt + Tt.
The representative agent maximizes the expected utility (2) under the con-
straints (3) and (4), and subject to an appropriate borrowing-limit condition, by
choosing consumption, Ct, asset holdings (Mt, Bt). Given Lagrange multipliers ψt
and λt attached to the constraints (3) and (4) the following first-order condition
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holds with respect to consumption
(5)
Uc(Ct)
Pt
= ψt + λt
showing that the liquidity constraint creates a wedge between the marginal utility
of nominal consumption and that of nominal wealth – the latter being captured
by λt. This wedge depends on the multiplier ψt, measuring the marginal util-
ity of liquidity. Optimality conditions with respect to money and bonds imply
respectively
(6) λt = β(1 + i
m
t )Et(ψt+1 + λt+1),
(7) λt = β(1 + it)Et(γt+1ψt+1 + λt+1).
A unit of currency carried from period t and invested in money delivers a return
(1+imt ) which can be used at time t+1 to purchase goods or for the remaining part
to contribute to next period wealth. Instead, a unit of wealth invested in bonds is
remunerated at (1 + it) but provides liquidity services only for the fraction γt+1.
Equations (6)–(7) show already that when γt+1 = 1 interest rates on money and
bonds are equalized because the two assets become perfect substitutes as a means
of payment. This happens also when the liquidity constraint is never binding, i.e.
when ψt = 0.
To see this formally, simplify the first-order conditions to
(8)
it − imt
1 + it
Et
{
Uc(Ct+1)
Pt+1
}
= Et {(1− γt+1)ψt+1} ,
(9) ψt =
Uc(Ct)
Pt
− β(1 + imt )Et
{
Uc(Ct+1)
Pt+1
}
.
In general, since ψt+1 and γt+1 are non-negative and γt+1 is bounded above by
1, money has a lower return than bonds, imt ≤ it, which depends on ψt+1 and
γt+1 and their covariance. For given ψt+1, when the liquidity properties of bonds
improve, the interest rate on bonds falls closer to that of money. Moreover, the
premium on bonds will be high when their liquidity properties, measured by γt+1,
correlate inversely with the marginal utility of liquidity, represented by ψt+1.
Money and bonds are supplied by the central bank and government, respec-
tively. Their integrated budget constraint can be written as
M st +B
s
t = (1 + it−1)B
s
t−1 + (1 + i
m
t−1)M
s
t−1 + Tt.
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Equilibrium in asset markets implies
Mt = M
s
t ,
Bt = B
s
t ,
while in goods market
Yt = Ct.
We solve for the equilibrium allocation of this model. The following set of equa-
tions
(10) (1 + imt−1)M
s
t−1 + γt(1 + it−1)B
s
t−1 ≥ PtYt,
(11)
it − imt
1 + it
Et
{
Uc(Yt+1)
Pt+1
}
= Et {(1− γt+1)ψt+1}
(12) ψt =
Uc(Yt)
Pt
− β(1 + imt )Et
{
Uc(Yt+1)
Pt+1
}
characterizes the equilibrium of prices, interest rates and the Lagrange multiplier
ψt for given exogenous processes {Yt, γt} considering that ψt ≥ 0. When ψt >
0, constraint (10) holds with equality. We further assume that there exists a
technology through which the representative agent can store currency unaltered
across periods so that the zero-lower bound on the nominal interest on money (or
reserves) applies.12 The following inequalities hold it ≥ imt ≥ 0.
The equilibrium conditions have six unknowns {M st , Bst , it, imt , Pt, ψt} which
leave room for the choice of three policy instruments.13 Considering an exogenous
path of the supply of bonds, we are left with two dimensions along which to choose
monetary policy.
II. Liquidity shocks and monetary policy
We study the effects of a liquidity shock which worsens the quality of the pseudo-
safe assets. At time 0 it is learnt that the liquidity properties of bonds temporarily
deteriorate – meaning a fall in γ starting from period 1 – and return back to
normal levels in each period with a constant probability ξ. Ex-post, the shock
12In our model Mst are the liabilities of the central bank and i
m
t is the interest rate paid by the central
bank on such liabilities. We call it interest rate on money or reserves interchangeably. Note that an
hypothetical corridor system is zero in our model so that the interest rate on reserves coincides at the
same time with the policy rate and the interest rate on the marginal lending facility.
13We are implicitly assuming that lump-sum taxes Tt vary appropriately in a way that the
transversality condition of households is satisfied at any equilibrium path of the stochastic processes
{Mst , Bst , it, imt , Pt, ψt}.
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lasts T periods until period T + 1.14
There are clearly no real effects of the shock because in the simple model of
the previous section prices are fully flexible. However, the way prices and interest
rates react to the shock can be already meaningful to intuit what will happen in
more complicated models.
The specification of monetary policy is important for the results. First, we
consider a benchmark policy in which the monetary policymaker is completely
“passive”. This policymaker keeps the interest rate on reserves unchanged and
at the same time does not alter the path of money growth with respect to the
previous trend. More broadly we can think of a policymaker that does not react
at all to the shock either with conventional policy, through the policy rate, nor
with unconventional policy, through the balance sheet.
In this context, the liquidity shock has two effects. The liquidity properties
of bonds deteriorate and this is immediately reflected into a fall in their price
and a rise in their yield, as shown in (11). To hold bonds, consumers ask for a
higher return to compensate for the worsening in their quality. On the other side,
there is a shortage of liquidity because the pseudo-safe assets have now a lower
acceptance rate in exchange for goods, as shown in (10). The overall shortage of
assets as means of payment implies a shortage of demand of consumption goods.
Since prices are flexible, they fall to keep the goods market in equilibrium. These
effects are shown in Figure 1 by the dotted line. The calibration implies that
before the shock the interest rate on bonds is about 5% at annual rates and the
interest rate on reserves is at 0.75%; money, prices and the supply of bonds grow
at 2% at annual rates. Under the benchmark “passive” policy, the interest rate on
reserves remains at 0.75% while money supply grows at 2%. We study the effects
of a full deterioration in the quality of pseudo-safe assets which brings γ from
20% to 0 for 10 quarters. This shock leads to an increase in the spread between
pseudo-safe and safe assets of about 13%. The price level falls substantially with
respect to the previous trend through a deep deflation.15
We compare the benchmark policy with two other policies in which the policy-
maker seeks to stabilize inflation rate at the 2% target. The two policies differ
because in one – the circled line in Figure 1 – the interest rate on reserves is kept
unchanged at the initial level while in the other – the solid line in Figure 1 – the
policymaker tries to insulate the interest rate on bonds from the shock.
We have seen that the excess demand of liquidity and the corresponding excess
14We assume that the realization of the shock is known one-period in advance by the monetary policy
maker, to allow the latter to have the possibility to stabilize it completely. This is because in our model
it is the money supply of previous period that influences the current price level. In this way, a feasible
policy is one in which there is complete stabilization of inflation – or the price level – around the target.
Moreover, consumers cannot infer Mst from the transfer Tt since the latter also includes B
s
t .
15The following quarterly calibration is used: β = .99. The initial ratio ofM/(PY ) is set at m¯ = 0.15·4,
while that of B/(PY ) at b¯ = .5 · 4, as implied by the US post-WWII average of the velocity of M1 and of
the debt-to-GDP ratio. Such calibration implies that the steady-state share of bonds providing liquidity
services consistent with the constraint (10) is about 20%, and the steady-state annualized interest rate
on bonds about 5%. In the initial equilibrium, the interest rate on money is set at 0.75% at annual rates
while the growth rates of money, prices and bonds are all 2% at annual rates.
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Figure 1. Response of selected variables to a 20% fall in the liquidity properties of bonds.
Dotted line: passive monetary policy. Circled line: monetary policy targets interest rate
on reserves and the inflation rate. Solid line: monetary policy targets interest rate on
bonds and the inflation rate. The probability that in each period the shock returns back to
steady state is ξ = 10%; the shock actually returns back after 10 quarters.
supply of goods translate into a fall in the price level. To keep instead prices on
their target, the excess demand of liquidity should be filled by assets with a high
degree of acceptance in exchange for goods. To this end, the growth of money
– the only safe asset in circulation since γ has fallen to zero – should increase
substantially with respect to the previous target.16 The effectiveness is shown
in Figure 1 for both the circled-line and solid-line policies: the balance sheet is
expanded by about 70% and prices are stabilized. The expansion should last
until the liquidity properties of bonds return back to the initial level. However,
this policy does not prevent the spillovers of the liquidity shock into a higher
interest rate on bonds. The expectation of a stable inflation throughout the
period, though, mutes the response of the interest rate on bonds, and the latter
therefore rises less than in the case of passive policy, as shown by the circled
line. To completely offset this surge, the monetary policymaker can in principle
lower the interest rate on reserves, up to the point in which the zero-lower bound
16If γ falls to a positive number it would be possible to meet the liquidity needs by increasing the supply
of bonds Bst , since this is an available policy instrument in this model. However, in the more general
model of the next section in which the pseudo-safe asset is a deposit security, its supply is endogenously
determined given some financial constraint at the level of the intermediary sector. We view the latter as
the most relevant case to consider.
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becomes relevant. If the shock is large in enough, as in Figure 1, the constraint
is binding and the interest rate on bonds still rises, although by a lower amount,
as shown by the solid line.17
At this point, it is useful to comment on the comparison between our analysis
and that of Poole (1970). In Poole (1970), the driving shock is on money demand,
and an interest-rate targeting policy fully stabilizes the economy because money
supply endogenously adjusts. In our framework, instead, we can interpret the
shock to γ either as a shock to the supply of liquidity or to demand. In the case
in which γ captures the intrinsic liquidity of the security in terms of the fraction
that can be mobilized, a change in γ can be interpreted as a shock to the supply
of liquidity. When instead γ captures the degree of acceptability of the securities
in exchange for goods, it can be interpreted as a shock to the demand of liquidity.
In both cases, given the overall demand of liquidity, a shock on γ endogenously
shifts the demand of money/reserves. However, in our model, differently from
Poole (1970) the monetary policymaker should specify two instruments of policy
rather than just one to be able to determine the equilibrium. In the model of this
section, we are concerned about the determination of prices while Poole (1970)
considers instead a sticky-price economy and therefore is concerned about the
determination of output. Moreover our model economy is subject to a zero-lower
bound on the interest rate on reserves, which can prevent a complete insulation
of the interest rate on bonds from the liquidity shock. Finally, it should be
noted that the timing of openings of goods and financial markets implies that the
nominal interest rate on bonds at time t is related negatively to expected output
and prices at time t+ 1, through the Euler equations (11) and (12), rather than
their current levels as in Poole (1970).
The simple model of this section does not have welfare implications because
agents get utility from consumption, which is always equal to output in equilib-
rium. However, two important results already emerge from the analysis. First,
to prevent prices from falling with respect to the target, the shortage of liquidity
should be offset by issuing more safe assets. Second, a negative liquidity shock
induces an upward pressure on the interest rate on bonds. The monetary poli-
cymaker can lean against it by cutting the interest rate on reserves. The extent
to which it can be successful, however, depends on whether the liquidity shock is
strong enough to drive the interest rate on reserves to the zero-lower bound.
It is interesting to note that the two policy implications underlined in this
section would be the result of an optimal policy problem in an extended version
of the model with endogenous production and nominal rigidities. However, in
the next section, we pursue a different avenue by proposing a model in which the
pseudo-safe security is an inside asset. The aim is to capture some features of the
recent financial crisis, in which the securities that lost their liquidity properties
17In the experiment of this section, we have focused on a monetary policy that acts directly through
injection of liquidity into the system. However, since bonds and money are not perfect substitutes
for liquidity purposes, the monetary policymaker can also operate by expanding money supply to buy
pseudo-safe assets. In this case, the consumers’ holdings of bonds, Bt, would fall during the experiment.
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were indeed privately issued.
III. A model with an inside pseudo-safe asset
Building on the insights of the previous simple model, we now present a more
articulated framework in which money coexists with an inside security that plays
the role of the pseudo-safe asset. In the model of this section financial interme-
diaries finance lending to the economy through deposits. Deposits and money
are the only two assets available in the economy. However, deposits have imper-
fect liquidity properties which can suddenly deteriorate.18 There are two groups
of agents: savers hold deposits and can use them to purchase goods together
with money. Borrowers can use only money for their goods purchases and fund
themselves directly from intermediaries. In this environment, we analyze the real
effects of a liquidity shock and the ensuing implications for monetary policy.
A. Households
Consider a closed-economy model with two types of agents: borrowers, denoted
with “b”, and savers, with “s”. There is a mass χ of savers and (1−χ) of borrowers
. Utility is given by
(13) Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
U(CjT )− V (LjT )
]
for j = b, s where Et denotes the standard conditional expectation operator and
β is the discount factor, with 0 < β < 1. C is a consumption bundle
C ≡
[∫ 1
0
C(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
where C(i) is the consumption of a generic good i produced in the economy and
θ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution with θ > 1; Lj is hours worked
of quality of labor j.
At the beginning of period t the goods market opens and the following constraint
limits the purchase of goods
(14) (1 + imt−1)M
j
t−1 + γt(1 + i
d
t−1)I
j
t−1B
j
t−1 ≥ PtCjt ,
for each j = b, s where Bjt−1 represents the per-capita holdings of the inside
18Indeed, at the onset of the US financial crisis, intermediaries and other special vehicle purposes that
were financing credit securities by issuing structured asset-backed securities experienced a drop in the
liquidity properties of their financing means. As well, short-term financing lines supporting holdings of
asset-backed securities suddenly lost their liquidity value.
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security and Ijt is an indicator function which takes the unit value only when
Bjt−1 is positive – in which case it pays off (1 + i
d
t−1) – and zero otherwise. When
in positive holdings, the inside asset takes the form of a deposit issued by the
intermediary and it is a substitute of money to a certain degree, where γt is the
quality value that the market attaches to it for its liquidity properties. All other
variables have been previously defined.
When the goods market closes, the asset market opens and agents adjust their
portfolios according to
(15) M jt +B
j
t ≤ (1− γt)(1 + idt−1)Ijt−1Bjt−1 + (1 + ibt−1)(1− Ijt−1)Bjt−1 +W jt Ljt
+ Ψjt + Υ
j
t + T
j
t + [(1 + i
m
t−1)M
j
t−1 + γt(1 + i
d
t−1)I
j
t−1B
j
t−1 − PtCjt ]
where (1 + ibt−1) is the nominal interest on borrowing, i.e. when B
j
t−1 is negative
and therefore Ijt−1 = 0; W
j
t denotes the nominal wage which is specific to labor
of agent j = b, s; Ψjt are profits obtained from goods production while Υ
j
t are the
profits of the intermediary sector.
“Savers” have positive holdings of the inside security, Bst > 0, while “borrowers”
have negative, and specular, ones, Bbt < 0. Since agents in the economy share
the same intertemporal discount factor, we can choose an initial steady state in
which a fraction, χ, of agents is of savers while the remaining one of borrowers. In
our experiment, we verify that borrowers and savers do not switch their portfolio
positions during the time in which the liquidity shock hits the economy.19
Agents choose consumption and hours worked to maximize utility (13) under
(14) and (15) taking into account standard borrowing-limit constraints. First-
order conditions of the two optimization problems are symmetric with respect to
consumption, money and labor
(16) Uc(C
j
t ) = (ψ
j
t + λ
j
t )Pt
(17) λjt = β(1 + i
m
t )Et(ψ
j
t+1 + λ
j
t+1),
(18) Vl(L
j
t ) = λ
j
tW
j
t
for j = b, s, where ψjt and λ
j
t are the respective Lagrange multipliers of constraints
(14) and (15). The first-order condition of the savers with respect to deposit
holdings implies
(19) λst = β(1 + i
d
t )Et(γt+1ψ
s
t+1 + λ
s
t+1),
19Later we specify assumptions such that the initial distribution of wealth is locally determinate.
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while that of the borrowers with respect to loans20
(20) λbt = β(1 + i
b
t)Etλ
b
t+1.
We can combine more compactly the above first-order conditions to obtain the
interest-rate spread between deposits and money
(21)
idt − imt
1 + idt
Et
{
Uc(C
s
t+1)
Pt+1
}
= Et
{
(1− γt+1)ϕst+1
Uc(C
s
t+1)
Pt+1
}
,
and between loans and money
(22)
ibt − imt
1 + ibt
Et
{
Uc(C
b
t+1)
Pt+1
}
= Et
{
ϕbt+1
Uc(C
b
t+1)
Pt+1
}
.
Deposit and loan rates are in general higher than the interest rate on money (or
reserves) insofar as the variables ϕst+1 and ϕ
b
t+1 are non-zero in some contingency,
where
(23) ϕjt = 1− β(1 + imt )Et
{
Uc(C
j
t+1)
Uc(C
j
t )
Pt
Pt+1
}
,
and we have used the following definitions ϕjt ≡ ψjtPt/Uc(Cjt ) for j = b, s. The
liquidity shock γt affects the interest-rate spread between deposits and money.
When the liquidity properties of deposits worsen, the interest rate on deposit rises.
This is one of the two new channels of transmission of financial crisis emphasized
by our framework. Differently from the existing literature the “financial”shock
does not raise directly the lending rate ibt but first it increases the deposit rate
idt . The other channel of transmission of the financial crisis is through equation
(14) in which the liquidity shock reduces the nominal value of security available
for purchasing goods.
Finally, we can write in a more compact way the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption through the following conditions
(24)
Vl(L
j
t )
Uc(C
j
t )
= (1− ϕjt )
W jt
Pt
,
for j = b, s. In this model, the liquidity constraint implies a financial friction which
is captured by the variables ϕjt . This friction creates also a wedge between the
real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption,
20In writing the intertemporal first-order conditions of savers and borrowers we have already accounted
for the fact that in equilibrium Bst > 0 and B
b
t < 0.
16 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
as shown in (24).21
B. Financial intermediaries
The additional financial friction of the model, on top of the liquidity constraints,
is that borrowing and lending should occur only through intermediaries which
channel liquidity from savers to borrowers. The aggregate level of deposits is
Dt = χB
s
t , and that of loans is At = −(1 − χ)Bbt . The intermediaries’ balance
sheet in each period implies At = Dt. An interesting feature of the liquidity
services provided by deposits is that, in the steady state, the interest rate on
loans is above the one on deposits. This can be seen by using equations (21), (22)
and (23) to get
(25)
ı¯d − ı¯m
1 + ı¯d
= (1− γ¯) ı¯
b − ı¯m
1 + ı¯b
where an upper bar denotes the steady-state value of the variable. Unless γ¯ = 0,
in which case deposits do not provide liquidity services, ı¯b > ı¯d.
Positive profits of intermediation naturally arise in our model because the li-
abilities of intermediaries are more liquid than their assets. Out of the steady
state, the spread between lending and deposit rates (ibt − idt ) is determined by the
optimal choice of lending capacity on the part of intermediaries, because of the
financial friction, as it is also in other models like Belongia and Ireland (2006,
2012) and Curdia and Woodford (2010). In these papers, however, the source of
the financial crisis is a credit shock that hits directly this spread by increasing
the lending rate while lowering the deposit rate. Instead, in our framework, this
credit spread is not the key driver of the transmission mechanism. As shown in the
Euler equation (21) a negative liquidity shock, worsening the liquidity properties
of deposits, raises instead the spread between deposit and money rate (idt − imt ).
Differently from the literature, intermediaries face then higher funding costs while
often in the literature the deposit rate falls following a credit shock. As we have
already emphasized, this is only one of the two transmission mechanisms of the
financial crisis in our model.
To close the model, we need to characterize the way credit spreads are set, and
therefore the pass-through of the liquidity shock to the lending rate. In line with
Belongia and Ireland (2006, 2012) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) we assume
costs of intermediation. These might well capture agency costs in increasing the
lending capacity on the side of intermediaries or other types of costs discussed in
the literature.
21This is consistent with the cash-in-advance constraint model of Cooley and Hansen (1989).
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Period t profits can be written in real terms as
Υt
Pt−1
= (1 + ibt−1)at−1 − (1 + idt−1)dt−1 − kt · φ
(at−1
a¯
)
which depend on the volume of lending and deposit supplied in the previous
period, where at ≡ At/Pt and dt ≡ Dt/Pt. The cost function is given by φ (·)
with the properties φ(1) = 0, φ′ (1) = 1 and φ′′ (1) > 0 where φ′ (·) and φ′′ (·)
are respectively the first and second derivatives of φ (·). The variable a¯ defines
the steady-state level of lending and kt is an appropriate scaling factor given by
kt = (1 + i
d
t−1)δ¯a¯ where δ¯ is the steady-state spread between lending and deposit
rates defined by (1 + δ¯) ≡ (1 + ı¯b)/(1 + ı¯d). We assume that the costs kt · φ (·)
are paid directly to the savers as are the profits of intermediation Υt, which are
known in period t− 1 and delivered in period t.22
An important implication of assuming a cost of intermediation penalizing lend-
ing with respect to the steady-state value is that the steady-state asset or liability
positions of savers and borrowers become locally determinate in this case. This
makes sure that after a liquidity shock, the distribution of wealth converges to the
initial steady state and savers and borrowers remains in their respective portfolio
positions.
In a competitive market, the spread between borrowing and lending rates that
maximizes profits is:
(26) 1 + δt ≡
(
1 + ibt
)
(1 + idt )
=
[
1 + δ¯φ′
(at
a¯
)]
.
It follows that the spread δt is increasing in the overall level of loans and is
consistent with its steady-state value since φ′ (1) = 1.23 However, it is worth
emphasizing again that this credit spread moves only endogenously in our model
depending on how the overall level of lending reacts to the liquidity shock affecting
directly the deposit rate idt . Instead, in the literature, the main financial shock
hits exogenously this spread and then propagates into the economy.
C. Firms
We assume that there is a continuum of firms of measure one, each producing
one of the goods in the economy. The production function Y (i) = L(i) is linear
in a bundle of labor which is a Cobb-Douglas index of the two types of labor:
L(i) = (Ls(i))χ(Lb(i))1−χ. Given this technology, labor compensation for each
type of worker is equal to total compensation WjLj = WL where the aggregate
22Quantitative results can be affected but not overturned by different assumptions on the distribution
of intermediation profits, as we will discuss later.
23The scaling factor kt appropriately normalizes the optimal spread around its steady state value.
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wage index is appropriately given by W = (W s)χ(W b)1−χ. Each firm faces a
demand of the form Y (i) = (P (i)/P )−θY where aggregate output is
(27) Yt = χC
s
t + (1− χ)Cbt .
Firms are subject to price rigidities as in Calvo’s model: in each period a fraction
of measure (1 − α) of firms with 0 < α < 1 is allowed to change its price, while
the remaining fraction α of firms indexes their previously-adjusted price to the
inflation-target rate Π¯. Adjusting firms choose prices to maximize the presented
discounted value of the profits under the circumstances that the prices chosen,
appropriately indexed to the inflation target, will remain in place
Et
∞∑
T=t
αT−tΛT
[
Π¯T−t
Pt(i)
PT
YT (i)− (1− τ)WT
PT
YT (i)
]
where ΛT is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate profits at a generic
time T , which is a linear combination of the marginal utilities of consumption of
the two agents, ΛT = β
T−t[χUc(CsT ) + (1 − χ)Uc(CbT )] and τ is an employment
subsidy. The first-order condition of the optimal pricing problem implies
(28)
P ∗t
Pt
= (1− τ) θ
θ − 1
Et
{∑∞
T=t α
T−tΛT
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)θ
WT
PT
YT
}
Et
{∑∞
T=t α
T−tΛT
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)1−θ
YT
}
where we have set Pt(i) = P
∗
t since all firms adjusting their prices will fix it at
the same price. Calvo’s model further implies the following law of motion for the
general price index
(29) P 1−θt = (1− α)P ∗1−θt + αP 1−θt−1 Π¯1−θ,
through which we can write the aggregate supply equation
(30)(
1− αΠθ−1t Π¯1−θ
1− α
) 1
1−θ
= (1− τ) θ
θ − 1
Et
{∑∞
T=t α
T−tΛT
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)θ
WT
PT
YT
}
Et
{∑∞
T=t α
T−tΛT
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)1−θ
YT
} .
We assume that the utility flow from consumption is exponential U(Cj) = 1 −
exp(−υCj) for some positive parameter υ while the disutility of working is isoe-
lastic v(Lj) = (Lj)1+η/(1 + η). The above assumptions are convenient for aggre-
gation purposes and to keep tractability. These features can be easily discovered
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by taking a weighted average of (24), for j = s, b, with weights χ and 1 − χ
respectively obtaining24
(31)
(Yt∆t)
η
υ exp(−υYt) =
Wt
Pt
(1− ϕst )χ(1− ϕbt)1−χ,
where aggregate output and labor are related through Yt∆t = Lt and ∆t is an
index of price dispersion defined by
∆t ≡
1∫
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
di,
which evolves as
(32) ∆t ≡ α
(
Πθt Π¯
−θ
)
∆t−1 + (1− α)
(
1− αΠθ−1t Π¯1−θ
1− α
) θ
θ−1
.
D. Government budget constraint and monetary policy
To complete the characterization of the model we specify the consolidated bud-
get constraint of government and central bank. We assume that there are no
government bonds or public spending. The consolidated budget constraint sim-
ply reads as
(33) Mt = (1 + i
m
t−1)Mt−1 + χT
s
t + (1− χ)T bt + τWtLt.
It is clear that with heterogenous agents the distribution of transfers matters for
the equilibrium allocation. Here we assume that each agent receives transfers
corresponding to its holdings of money after subtracting a proportional share of
the employment subsidy:
(34) T st = M
s
t − (1 + imt−1)M st−1 − τWtLt,
(35) T bt = M
b
t − (1 + imt−1)M bt−1 − τWtLt.
Later, in Section IV.E, we discuss an alternative transfer rule.
24In deriving (31), the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production technology is also critical. It should
be noted that another implication of our specification of preferences and production technology is that
the steady-state level of output implied by (31) does not depend on the distribution of wealth. Indeed,
in a steady state in which Πt = Π¯ prices will be set as as a mark-up over wages and moreover ϕ¯s = ϕ¯b
in a way that the steady-state output implied in (31) is invariant to the distribution of wealth across
agents.
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E. Equilibrium in goods and asset markets
In equilibrium money supply is equal to money demand
(36) Mt = χM
s
t + (1− χ)M bt ,
while financial market equilibrium requires
(37) (1− χ)Bbt + χBst = 0.
Goods market equilibrium is given by (27).
Moreover, since only savers hold deposit for purchasing purposes, constraints
(14) for j = b, s imply
(38) (1 + imt−1)M
b
t−1 ≥ PtCbt
(39) (1 + imt−1)M
s
t−1 + γt(1 + i
d
t−1)B
s
t−1 ≥ PtCst .
F. Equilibrium conditions
We collect now the equations that characterize the equilibrium of the model.
On the demand side, there are equations (21) and (22), and (23) for each j = b, s.
Lending and borrowing interest rates are connected through equation (26). The
two liquidity constraints (38) and (39) can be written in real terms as
(40) (1 + imt−1)
mbt−1
Πt
≥ Cbt
and
(41) (1 + imt−1)
mst−1
Πt
+ γt(1 + i
d
t−1)
(1− χ)
χ
bt−1
Πt
≥ Cst
where mbt ≡M bt /Pt, mst ≡M st /Pt while bt denotes the real debt of the borrowers
given by bt ≡ −Bbt/Pt. To obtain (41), we have also used (37).
In real terms equation (36) implies
(42) χmst + (1− χ)mbt = mt,
where mt denotes aggregate real money balances, defined as mt ≡Mt/Pt.
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The flow budget constraint of the borrowers can be simplified, using (35), to
(43) bt = (1 + i
b
t−1)
bt−1
Πt
+ Cbt − Yt,
where we have used the fact that the Cobb-Douglas technology implies that
W bt L
b
t = WtLt together with the assumption Υ
b
t = 0.
25
On the aggregate supply side, there is equation (30) together with (31) and
(32) and the relationship Yt∆t = Lt.
The set of equations (21), (22), (23) for each j = b, s together with (26),
(27), (30), (31), (32), (40), (41), (42), (43), describe the equilibrium conditions
of the model together with the two Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the
constraints (40), (41) and the inequalities ϕst ≥ 0, ϕbt ≥ 0. There are 13 equations
in the following 15 unknowns Yt, C
b
t , C
s
t , i
b
t , i
d
t , i
m
t ,∆t, Wt/Pt, Pt, bt, ϕ
s
t , ϕ
b
t ,
mst ,m
b
t , mt leaving the possibility to specify two instruments of policy.
IV. Liquidity shocks and optimal monetary policy
We repeat the experiment of a shock that worsens the liquidity properties of the
pseudo-safe asset. The model has now a richer transmission mechanism and there
is also a propagation of the shock to the real economy for two reasons: i) there
are redistributive effects between borrowers and savers because the inside asset is
in nominal terms; ii) the presence of nominal rigidities. We compare alternative
monetary regimes with the Ramsey policy that maximizes the weighted sum of
the utility of the consumers belonging to the economy:
(44) Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
χ˜(U(CsT )− V (LsT )) + (1− χ˜)(U(CbT )− V (LbT ))
]
,
given the equilibrium conditions of the model, in which χ˜ and (1 − χ˜) are the
relative weights, respectively, of savers and borrowers in the objective function.
To get intuition about the underlining trade-offs, we can derive a simple quadratic
loss function corresponding to just a second-order approximation of (44) under
some relatively minor restrictions. In particular, we use assumptions such that
the steady state resulting from the Ramsey problem coincides with the efficient
steady-state allocation of consumption and labor. This efficient allocation solves
the maximization of (44) under the resource constraint
χCst + (1− χ)Cbt = Yt = (Lst )
χ
(Lb)1−χ.
In particular, as discussed in the Appendix, the first-order conditions of this
25If all the profits of intermediation were rebated to the borrowers, it would be easy to see that the
relevant interest rate in (43) is the deposit rate, idt , instead of the loan rate, i
b
t .
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problem imply
(45)
χ˜
1− χ˜
Uc(C¯
s)
Uc(C¯b)
=
χ
1− χ
(46)
Vl(L¯
j)
Uc(C¯j)
=
Y¯
L¯j
where the latter holds for each j = b, s. This is clearly the best allocation that can
be achieved in this model, for given weights χ˜ and (1− χ˜). If the Ramsey policy-
maker could implement this allocation in the steady state, this would correspond
to the Ramsey optimal policy when there are no stochastic disturbances.
We show that the combination of policies: Πt = Π¯ and i
m
t = ı¯
m where Π¯ ≥ β
and 0 ≤ ı¯m ≤ Π¯/β − 1 can indeed implement the first best, under two minor
restrictions.26 The first restriction requires that the employment subsidy to firms
is set at τ = (µ¯+ϕ¯)/(1+µ¯) where µ¯ ≡ (θ−1)−1 and ϕ¯ = ϕ¯s = ϕ¯b are, respectively,
the steady-state net markup and level of the financial friction. Indeed, a policy
in which Πt = Π¯ implies in equation (30) that
W¯
P¯
=
1
(1− τ)(1 + µ¯)
which can be used in the steady-state version of (24) to get
(47)
Vl(L¯
j)
Uc(C¯j)
=
1− ϕ¯
(1− τ)(1 + µ¯)
Y¯
L¯j
,
for each j = b, s. With the chosen subsidy τ = (µ¯ + ϕ¯)/(1 + µ¯), equation (47) is
equivalent to (46).
To implement (45), note that Πt = Π¯ and i
m
t = ı¯
m imply that
(48) C¯s =
1− χ
χ
(
1− β
β
)
b¯+ Y¯
(49) C¯b = −
(
1− β
β
)
b¯+ Y¯
where we have used the steady-state version of (20), (27) and (43). Given that
b¯ > 0, it follows that C¯s > C¯b. For given C¯s and C¯b, in order to implement
26It should be recalled that we can specify two policy instruments in our model.
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condition (45), we add the second restriction which involves an appropriately
chosen weight χ˜: in particular, χ˜ > χ.
An interesting implication of our implementation exercise is that the Ramsey
policymaker can achieve the first best for any choice of ı¯m in the interval [0, Π¯/β−
1] implying, from the steady-state version of (23), that the Lagrange multiplier
ϕ¯ can fall anywhere in the interval [0, 1 − β/Π¯]. At the lower end of the range,
the case ϕ¯ = 0 corresponds to the Friedman’s rule which requires to completely
eliminate the financial friction. However, in our case also positive values of ϕ¯ are
equivalent in terms of welfare. We can indeed choose a steady-state value of ϕ¯
different from zero, in the above interval, and get the same first-best allocation
of consumption and labor and, at the same time, be consistent with the optimal
choice of a Ramsey policymaker.27 Notice that a positive steady-state value of
the multiplier ϕ¯ is particularly convenient in our framework because it makes the
financial friction non-negligible in a first-order approximation of our model.28 To
further justify this choice, it is worth noting that in heterogenous-agent stochastic
models with incomplete markets the Friedman’s rule is not achievable. In our
model, indeed, it requires to set ϕst and ϕ
b
t simultaneously to zero at all times, but
this is not feasible unless Uc(C
s
t+1)/Uc(C
s
t ) = Uc(C
b
t+1)/Uc(C
b
t ) in all contingencies
as shown in (23).29
We show in the Appendix that under these two assumptions, a second-order
approximation of (44) delivers the following simple quadratic loss function
1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
Yˆ 2T +χ(1−χ)λc(CˆsT−CˆbT )2+χ(1−χ)λl(LˆsT−LˆbT )2+λpi(piT−p¯i)2
]}
where in general variables with a “hat” are log–deviations from their own steady
state, while Cˆjt ≡ (Cjt − C¯j)/Y¯ for each j = b, s, pit = lnPt/Pt−1 and p¯i = ln Π¯.
The positive coefficients λc, λl and λpi are all defined in the Appendix.
The loss function contains some familiar terms to the literature. The only shock
of the model is to liquidity, which is an inefficient shock, therefore deviations
of output with respect to the efficient steady state are penalized appropriately.
Inflation is also costly when it deviates from the trend to which price setters index
prices, implying inefficient fluctuations of relative prices among goods produced
according to the same technology. The other two terms in the loss function instead
depend on the additional features that the heterogeneity of agents brings into the
model. Since risk sharing of consumption and labor is efficient in the chosen
steady state, departures from this allocation cause losses for aggregate welfare.
27Note that our framework nests standard results on the Friedman’s rule. In the case in which µ¯ = 0,
τ = 0 and prices are flexible, it is optimal only to set ϕ¯ = 0. However, this does not necessarily imply
a rate of deflation equal to the time discount factor, since ı¯m is also a policy variable and therefore
Π¯ = β(1 + ı¯m). Only if ı¯m = 0, as assumed in the literature, Π¯ = β.
28The two liquidity constraints, for borrowers and savers, will hold with equality in this steady state.
29See Woodford (1990) for a general discussion.
24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
In particular, the labor risk-sharing term can be further simplified noting that in
a first-order approximation
Lˆst − Lˆbt = −
ρ
1 + η
(Cˆst − Cˆbt )−
1
(1− ϕ¯)(1 + η)(ϕ
s
t − ϕbt),
where ρ = υY¯ . In standard models without financial frictions, the labor risk-
sharing argument is proportional to the consumption risk-sharing term. Here,
instead, it is also influenced by the difference between the financial distortions
faced by savers and borrowers. Since in a first-order approximation of (23) we get
ϕjt = ϕ¯+ (1− ϕ¯)Et
[
(pit+1 − p¯i)− ıˆmt + ρ∆Cˆjt+1
]
for j = b, s, we can simplify the labor risk-sharing term to
(50) Lˆst − Lˆbt = −
ρ
1 + η
Et(Cˆ
s
t+1 − Cˆbt+1).
Because of the financial friction, labor effort at time t is producing income which
is only liquid to purchase goods in the next period.30 As shown by the first-order
condition (24), using (23), the consumers are optimally choosing labor given cur-
rent wages and future prices taking into account their expectations of future con-
sumption. It follows that the cross-agent difference in labor effort is proportional
to the difference in the one-period ahead consumption expectations. Equivalently,
we can write the loss function as
(51)
1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
Yˆ 2T +χ(1−χ)λc
(
CˆRT
)2
+χ(1−χ)λ˜l
(
ET Cˆ
R
T+1
)2
+λpi(piT − p¯i)2
]}
for some λ˜l, where Cˆ
R
T ≡ CˆsT−CˆbT . We compute the optimal policy under commit-
ment by minimizing this loss function with respect to the log-linear approximation
of the equilibrium conditions.31
In order to provide a numerical illustration of the policy implications of our
framework, we calibrate the model (quarterly) as follows. As in Curdia and
Woodford (2010), we set the steady-state real interest rate on deposits to 4% and
the steady-state credit spread δ¯ to 2%, both in annual terms. Moreover, we also
set the steady-state inflation rate p¯i to 2%, annualized. Accordingly, the implied
steady-state annualized nominal interest rate faced by the borrowers ı¯b is equal to
30It should be noted that (50) is valid also when ϕ¯ = 0 and that it captures the impossibility to achieve
the Friedman’s rule in the stochastic equilibrium (ϕst = ϕ
b
t) unless ∆Cˆ
b
t+1 = ∆Cˆ
s
t+1 at all times.
31The solution of the above optimization problem with respect to all the endogenous variables involved
corresponds to the first-order approximation of the solution of the non-linear Ramsey problem (see
Benigno and Woodford, 2012).
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8%, and the time discount factor is thereby β = .985. The steady-state interest
rate on reserves ı¯m is calibrated at 75 annual basis point.32 We use the average
velocity of M1 for the U.S. economy during the Great Moderation (1984-2007) to
calibrate the steady-state money to GDP ratio: M/PY = 0.125 ·4, and we follow
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) in setting the initial private debt to income ratio
b¯/4Y¯ to 100%. The economy-wide liquidity constraint and equation (25) thereby
imply that about 27% of assets provide liquidity services (i.e. γ¯ = 0.27) and that
the share of savers in the economy is about 55%.33 We follow Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012) also in setting the elasticity of the credit spread to the stock of
real debt, such that a 30% increase in debt doubles the spread.34 A given value
for the initial debt to income ratio, then, pins down a unique initial distribution
of wealth: indeed, equations (48) and (49) yield the distribution of personal
consumption, which in turn implies the distribution of money holdings, through
equations (40) and (41). Finally, the relative risk-aversion coefficient is set to
ρ = 1, the inverse of the Frisch-elasticity of labor supply to η = 2, the parameter α
capturing the degree of nominal rigidity in the model implies an average duration
of consumer prices of four quarters (α = 0.75).
In the simulations below, we assume that the liquidity index γˆt ≡ γt−γ¯1−γ¯ follows
an autoregressive process of the kind γˆt = ργ γˆt−1 + εγ and analyze the dynamic
effect of a 11% negative shock which gradually reverts back to mean, with half life
of about four quarters (ργ=0.85). The size of the shock is chosen in order to imply
a peak response of the credit spread of 4 percentage points above steady state,
which corresponds to the exogenous credit-spread shock simulated in Curdia and
Woodford (2010).
A. Optimal unconventional policies following a liquidity shock
In Figures 2 and 3 we compare the optimal policy (solid line) with a passive
monetary policy in which the interest rate on reserves and the growth rate of
the nominal money supply are kept constant at the levels before the shock hits
(dotted line).
There are two important policy implications on what monetary policy should
do when facing a liquidity shock. Inject more liquidity in the form of reserves, as
shown in Figure 2, and lower the interest rate on reserves up to the zero lower
bound, as shown in Figure 3. Although it is in general hard to isolate the effects
of the two channels in the general equilibrium of the model, we argue that the
injection of liquidity avoids the deflation and the contraction in real activity, while
lowering the interest rate on reserves helps to achieve a better risk sharing of the
shock between savers and borrowers.35
32This is the level at which the interest rate on reserves was set when it was introduced by the Fed.
33The implied fraction of pseudo-safe asset is consistent with the 30% estimated by Gorton, Lewellen
and Metrick (2010).
34This elasticity corresponds to the parameter φ defined in the Appendix.
35As it will be discussed later, the second policy prescription is ineffective without the first.
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The transmission of the liquidity shock can be understood in a simple way
through two main mechanisms.
First, the liquidity shock creates, at an aggregate level, a shortage in the sup-
ply of the assets available for goods purchasing, because pseudo-safe assets have
partially lost their qualities. An excess supply of goods is the corresponding dis-
equilibrium in the goods market to that in asset market due to the shortage of
safe assets. Nominal spending falls, and the split between prices and real output
depends on the degree of price rigidities. This is what happens under the passive
policy: real output drops widely, as shown in the figure, with a contraction of
about 15% while prices fall by about 7% compared to their trend, through a deep
deflation. The figure clearly illustrates the dramatic effects of a liquidity shock
when the monetary policymaker is completely helpless. Under optimal policy,
instead, the contraction in real output is very mild as well as the response of
inflation and prices. The key change in policy, that leads to a near stabiliza-
tion of output and prices, is the increase in the growth rate of money, as shown
in Figure 2, which goes up to a path about 40% above the previous trend. A
substantial expansion in the central bank’s balance sheet and an increase in the
supply of safe assets are required to optimally absorb the shock. Interestingly,
the expansion should last for as long as the liquidity conditions are deteriorated,
slowly returning back to the initial path as the liquidity properties of assets go
back to normal.
The second mechanism of propagation works through asset prices. The liquidity
shock requires a higher premium to hold pseudo-safe assets. This in turn increases
the cost of funding for intermediaries which need to raise the interest rate on loans.
Under the passive monetary policy, spreads and interest rates increase as shown
in Figure 3. Under optimal policy, all market interest rates are instead insulated
from the shock and stable around the previous steady-state levels. The important
change in policy that helps explaining this result is the reduction in the interest
rate on reserves up to the zero bound and for a quite long horizon. To intuit this
result, Figure 3 displays the consumption of savers and borrowers, respectively,
and their difference. As shown in the loss function (51), imperfect consumption
risk-sharing is costly in this economy. Under the passive monetary policy, the rise
in the real interest rates has important wealth and redistributive effects between
borrowers and savers. Borrowers are hit in a significant way by the increase in
the real rate on loans, so that they have to cut on their consumption.36 Their
real debt even rises, mostly because of the deflation. Savers instead benefit from
the increase in the real return on their savings and can raise their consumption
by holding more safe assets at the expenses of borrowers.37 Under optimal policy,
instead, the interest rate on reserves falls and this stabilizes all other market
36This is also the case if the profits of financial intermediary are all distributed to the borrowers. In
this case, the relevant interest rate is the deposit rate.
37On impact savers’ consumption falls, as the liquidity value of their accumulated pseudo-safe assets
shrinks and they are unable to reallocate their portfolio.
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Figure 2. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets: passive monetary regime vs optimal policy. Dotted line: monetary policy keeps
both the money growth and the interest rate on reserves imt constant (passive regime). Solid
line: optimal monetary policy. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters
(ργ=0.85).
interest rates.38 The redistributive channel, which was strong under the passive
policy, is now muted. Borrowers face approximately the same real interest rate as
before the shock, and do not have to cut consumption. Savers can increase their
money holdings to replace the deteriorated pseudo-safe assets without crowding
out money holdings of borrowers. This is because the central bank injects more
liquidity.
We can now appreciate some important differences between our model and those
of the recent literature on financial crisis and unconventional policies. First, as
we have already emphasized, the main shock on which the literature has focused
hits directly the credit spread ibt − idt by raising the interest rate on lending and
lowering the deposit rate. Instead, in our model, the liquidity shock raises directly
the deposit rates which is then passed through into higher lending rates creating
at the same time a shortage of safe assets. Second, in models like Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012), a deleveraging shock on borrowers’ debt is responsible of
the same rise in credit spreads emphasized by the literature but also of a drop in
38It is worth noting that the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet, by stabilizing output and
inflation, also contributes to more stable nominal interest rates, as the latter depend also on the expected
paths of the former.
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Figure 3. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets: passive monetary regime vs optimal policy. Dotted line: monetary policy keeps
both the money growth and the interest rate on reserves imt constant (passive regime). Solid
line: optimal monetary policy. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters
(ργ=0.85).
the natural rate of interest which requires a parallel fall in the real interest rate.
As a consequence, savers need to increase their consumption to compensate for
the fall of the deleveragers. Instead in our model, the different source of shock
implies that the real rate does not need to move much under optimal policy.
Consumption of savers and borrowers should remain at the levels before the shock
hits. Third, in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012), the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rate is a constraint to achieve
the optimal stabilization of aggregate objectives like output and inflation. In
our model, instead, the zero-lower bound is only a constraint to achieve a better
risk-sharing of the shock between borrowers and savers.39 Instead, balance-sheet
policies should take care of aggregate objectives: their primary role is to fulfill
the shortage of safe assets and not necessarily to reduce credit spreads, as mostly
emphasized by the literature.
39As it will be shown later, in our model, in contrast to Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eg-
gertsson and Krugman (2012), an inflation targeting policy or a nominal-GDP targeting policy can be
implemented in all periods if the central bank is willing to commit to it, but this necessarily requires an
expansion in the balance sheet exactly for the periods in which the liquidity properties are deteriorated.
The zero-lower bound is not necessarily a constraint for these policies.
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Figure 4. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets: active monetary regime vs optimal policy. Bold solid line: monetary policy
implements nominal-gdp targeting and seeks stabilization of idt . Thin solid line: optimal
monetary policy. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters (ργ=0.85).
B. The optimality of nominal-GDP targeting at the zero bound
We further investigate the features of the optimal policy and compare it with
a targeting regime that can approximate it, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. The
scale of these figures is rather different from the previous ones and enables us to
appreciate more the variation of the variables of interest. We display the optimal
policy in contrast with a simple policy in which nominal GDP is stabilized in each
quarter and the interest rate on reserves is lowered in order to insulate the interest
rate on deposits from the liquidity shock. Under the calibration considered, the
shock is too large to successfully stabilize the interest rate on deposits in all
periods because the zero-lower bound becomes a relevant constraint for some
quarters. This simple targeting regime can approximate quite well the optimal
policy along the objectives of the loss function (51): the deviations are in general
small and imply negligible losses in terms of welfare, unlike the case of passive
monetary policy.40
We can further study the extent to which lowering the interest rates on re-
40A result not shown in the graph is that a combined policy of strict inflation targeting with a stable
interest rate on deposits gets also very close to optimal policy, but performs slightly worse than nominal-
GDP targeting along all three dimensions relevant for welfare (relative consumption, real output and
inflation).
30 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
0 10 20 30
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
i.r. on deposits (%)
 
 
mp targets i.r. on deposits and nominal gdp
0 10 20 30
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
real consumption (savers)
 
 
optimal monetary policy
0 10 20 30
0
20
40
60
80
nominal money (savers)
0 10 20 30
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
i.r. on loans (%)
0 10 20 30
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
real consumption (borrowers)
0 10 20 30
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
nominal money (borrowers)
0 10 20 30
−0.25
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
i.r. on reserves (%)
0 10 20 30
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
relative consumption
0 10 20 30
−0.5
0
0.5
real debt
Figure 5. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets: active monetary regime vs optimal policy. Bold solid line: monetary policy
implements nominal-gdp targeting and seeks stabilization of idt . Thin solid line: optimal
monetary policy. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters (ργ=0.85).
serves up to the zero-lower bound is an important tool for sterilizing the shock.
Consider a policy in which nominal GDP is stabilized in each period but where
now the interest rate on reserve is held constant. In Figure 6, we add this policy
in comparison with the previous one and the optimal policy. When the interest
rate on reserves is unchanged, a policy of targeting nominal GDP can stabilize
completely inflation at the target but also real output. However, consumption
dispersion across agents substantially rises. There is a trade-off between aggregate
targets (output and inflation) on the one side, and cross-sectional ones (consump-
tion dispersion) on the other.41 As we conjectured, therefore, it is the cut in the
interest rate on reserves that allows the central bank to improve the risk shar-
ing of the liquidity shock, albeit at the cost of slightly more volatile output and
inflation.42
Notice, however, that such cut in the interest rate on reserves would be mostly
ineffective unless it is associated with the expansion in the central bank’s balance
sheet. Indeed, consider a policy in which nominal reserves are kept on the initial
41The same implication clearly follows if monetary policy targets inflation instead of nominal GDP.
42Note, however, that expansionary balance-sheet policies, even when interest rates on reserves are
kept constant, mitigate the rise in the deposit and loan rates, in contrast to the completely passive policy
of Figures 3 and 4, thus substantially stabilizing the credit spread.
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Figure 6. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets: alternative active monetary regimes vs optimal policy. Bold solid line: monetary
policy implements nominal-gdp targeting and seeks stabilization of idt . Dotted line: same as
before but now monetary policy keeps imt constant. Solid line: optimal monetary policy. The
half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters (ργ=0.85).
path, and the central bank seeks to stabilize the interest rate on deposits in each
period, through adjusting the interest rate on reserves. Figure 7 displays the
response of the economy under this regime (bold solid line) and contrasts it with
the passive regime of Figures 2 and 3 and the nominal-GDP targeting regime of
Figures 4 and 5. As shown by the bold solid line in Figure 7, under a regime
that seeks to stabilize the interest rate on deposits without adjusting also the
rate of growth of money, the interest rate on reserves would have to stay at the
zero-lower bound about twice as long as in the case in which the central bank
were also adjusting its balance sheet, and to substantially overshoot its long-run
equilibrium level afterwards. Overall, however, the gains from this policy regime
are limited to a faster convergence of the interest rate on deposits (and the credit
spread) to steady state, while inflation, real activity and consumption dispersion
evolve in the same way as under the completely passive one.
Finally, Figure 4 shows another interesting feature of optimal policy, i.e. that
the long-run price level remains above the initial trend. A policy of nominal-GDP
targeting, instead, implies long-run convergence of the price level to the initial
path. In this respect, a policy that commits to raise the nominal-GDP target
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Figure 7. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets under alternative targeting regimes. Bold solid line: monetary policy seeks
stabilization of idt but keeps money growth constant. Dotted line: monetary policy keeps
both money growth and imt constant. Solid line: monetary policy seeks stabilization of both
idt and nominal gdp. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters (ργ=0.85).
permanently after the shock will perform better.43 In the next section, we also
investigate the nature of this long-run price divergence under optimal policy.
C. Monetary policy tapering and exit from the zero bound
We now turn to analyze how the unconventional policy responses depend on
the dynamic features of the liquidity shock. Figure 8 displays the responses of
the interest rate on reserves, the detrended level of reserves and the price level
to a 11% negative liquidity shock with different dynamic features, displayed in
the bottom-right panel. In particular, the dash-dotted and solid lines show the
cases of autoregressive processes with a half life of 1 and 4 quarters, respectively;
the dashed line shows the case of a Markov-switching process for which, in every
period, the liquidity properties go back to normal with probability ξ = 10% and
stay at the lower level with probability 1− ξ. In all cases, the liquidity properties
fall initially by the same amount (−11%), but then return to normal conditions
with different speed.
As the figure shows, the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet is, on
43We do not show this in the graph, but overall the improvements are marginal.
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Figure 8. Responses of selected variables to negative liquidity shocks of same size but dif-
ferent persistence, under the optimal monetary policy. Dash-dotted line: low persistence,
half-life of 1 quarter (ργ = 0.5). Solid line: benchmark case, half-life of about 4 quarters
(ργ = 0.85). Dashed line: 11% shock with 10% probability that in each period the shock
returns back to steady state; the shock actually returns back after 10 quarters.
impact, the same across the three specifications, but the shape of the tapering
is inherited from the properties of persistence of the shock. In the case of the
Markov-switching process, in particular, the monetary policymaker keeps nominal
reserves on the new path and suddenly brings them back to the old one as soon as
the liquidity properties are back to normal. Moreover, the stay at the zero-lower
bound is longer, the more persistent is the shock. If the liquidity shock reverts
back fast enough, the interest rate on deposits can be insulated from the shock
without bringing the interest rate on reserves to zero. Analogously to Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), to enhance the effectiveness of the policy action during the
shock, in the case of a Markov-switching process the central bank is required to
commit to keep the interest rate on reserves at the zero bound longer than the
duration of the shock, and to overshoot its long-run level afterwards.
Interestingly, the duration at the zero-lower bound is linked to a commitment
to keep the future price level permanently above the initial trend even after the
shock has faded away.44 Indeed, the longer the stay at the zero bound, the higher
44If nominal interest rates could turn negative, the price level would increase more, the more persistent
the shock, but it would always converge back to the initial trend as the shock reverses to zero, regardless
of its persistence.
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Figure 9. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets under the optimal monetary policy: the role of price stickiness. Dash-dotted
line: prices are reset every 13 weeks. Solid line: prices are reset every 4 quarters. Dashed
line: prices are reset every 10 quarters. The half-life of the liquidity shock is about 4
quarters (ργ=0.85).
the long-run price-level path to which monetary policy should commit. This is
in line with other models of optimal policy under the zero-bound constraint, like
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
D. The role of price rigidities
Finally, Figure 9 studies whether the degree of price stickiness plays a role in
driving the results. In particular, the figure displays the response of the same
variables as in Figure 7 to a 11% deterioration of the liquidity properties of the
pseudo-safe asset, for different degrees of price stickiness. Interestingly, the figure
shows that under optimal monetary policy, the economy is required to stay at the
zero-lower bound longer, the stickier are consumer prices. Differently from Figure
7, however, the stay at the zero-lower bound in this case is inversely related to the
increase in the price-level path to which monetary policy has to commit in the
distant future. On the one hand, indeed, more flexible consumer prices reduce the
welfare costs of inflation, thereby allowing the central bank to focus more actively
on the other stabilization objectives by committing strongly to increase the long-
run price level. On the other hand, the stronger commitment to an increase of the
future price level requires a shorter stay at the zero-lower bound, because more
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE BENIGNO AND NISTICO`: SAFE ASSETS 35
flexible consumer prices favor a quicker convergence to the new target path.
An additional important insight of Figure 9 is that the main policy implications
of our model do not depend much on the degree of nominal rigidity. The size of
the expansion in the balance sheet of the central bank, as well as the shape of the
exit path, is independent of the degree of price stickiness. Monetary policy should
offset the shortage of nominal safe assets by supplying more money in order to
stabilize nominal GDP in the economy.
The need to lower the interest-rate on reserves, hitting the zero-lower bound at
least on impact, is also independent of the degree of price stickiness. Indeed, even
under high price flexibility (the dash-dotted line in the figure) a liquidity shock
has substantial real redistributive effects between savers and borrowers, which
require a policy intervention to counteract them.
E. The role of the transfer scheme
Until now we have assumed that each agent receives transfers corresponding to
its own holdings of money, net of a proportional share of the employment subsidy,
as shown by equations (34)–(35). It is clear, however, that with heterogenous
agents the distribution of transfers is not neutral for the equilibrium allocation.
Here we evaluate the implications of assuming an alternative transfer scheme,
namely one in which each agent receives a proportional share of the overall in-
crease in money supply:
(52) T st = T
b
t = Mt − (1 + imt−1)Mt−1 − τWtLt.
The first implication of this alternative transfer scheme is that the budget con-
straint of borrowers is no longer described by equation (43), but it now reflects
the wedge between their own holdings of money and the new transfers:
(53) bt = (1 + i
b
t−1)
bt−1
Πt
+ Cbt − Yt +mbt −mt − (1 + imt−1)
mbt−1 −mt−1
Πt
.
Figure 10 displays the response of selected variables to a liquidity shock under
optimal monetary policy, and compares the two transfer schemes described by
equations (34)–(35) on the one hand and (52) on the other. The main implication
of Figure 10 is twofold.
On the one hand, it confirms that an interest-rate cut to the zero-lower bound
and an increase in the size of the central bank’s balance sheet are required to
minimize the welfare costs of a liquidity deterioration of pseudo-safe assets. The
balance–sheet expansion is slightly larger than under idiosyncratic transfers, both
on impact and along the transition. The stay at the zero-lower bound, on the
contrary, is considerably shorter than before, and the interest-rate on reserves
overshoots its steady-state level immediately afterwards. Behind these dynam-
ics there is a different response of the borrowers’ money holdings (which now
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Figure 10. Responses of selected variables to a 11% fall in the liquidity properties of pseudo-
safe assets under optimal monetary policy: the role of money transfers. Thin solid line:
benchmark specification with idiosyncratic transfers, as in equations (34)–(35). Bold solid
line: alternative specification with aggregate transfers, as in equation (52). The half-life
of the liquidity shock is about 4 quarters (ργ=0.85).
increase both on impact and along the transition) and a stronger effectiveness
of the balance-sheet channel in stabilizing market interest rate at short horizons.
Indeed, a regime in which the central bank expands its balance sheet while leaving
constant the interest rate on reserves would be very effective in stabilizing the
interest rate on deposits, especially after three quarters from the shock.45 This
leaves much less need for the interest rate on reserves to stay at the zero-lower
bound for longer than a couple of quarters.
On the other hand, the bottom panels of Figure 10 show that the implied fluc-
tuations of the welfare-relevant variables (hence the implied welfare loss) under
the aggregate transfer scheme are substantially larger than those under the id-
iosyncratic scheme. The latter, indeed, allows the central bank to provide more
safe assets specifically to those agents who need them the most, to substitute the
pseudo-safe assets that have suddenly become illiquid.
45The complete set of simulations under all regimes is available from the authors upon request.
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V. Conclusions
We have presented monetary models in which the main novelty is that financial
assets can have different liquidity properties. In this framework, we studied the
effects on the economy of a change in these properties for some assets, which we la-
belled pseudo-safe or pseudo-liquid assets. The overall shortage of safe assets can
produce significant effects on nominal spending, and thereby on aggregate prices
and real activity, in a proportion that depends on the degree of nominal rigidi-
ties. A deep recession cum deflation can emerge for a reasonable parametrization.
At the same time, in a model in which the pseudo-safe asset is a deposit secu-
rity through which intermediaries finance their loans, a liquidity shock raises the
funding costs of intermediaries which is passed through into higher loan rates.
This shock has important distributional effects between borrowers and savers,
with borrowers adversely hit by the rise in the loan rates.46
The role of monetary policy is critical for the propagation of the shock. Two
instruments can be used to minimize the welfare consequences of the shock both
at the aggregate and distributional level. The monetary policymaker should offset
the shortage of safe assets by issuing more liquidity in the form of money, which
remains a safe asset in circulation in the model. This can be achieved by a policy
of increasing the path of nominal reserves in the vein of Quantitative Easing, to
stabilize the inflation rate around the target as well as nominal and real output.
Moreover, the interest rate on reserves should be reduced in order to insulate the
interest rate on the pseudo-safe assets and the interest-rate spreads. This policy
improves the risk sharing of the liquidity shock between savers and borrowers and
avoids a consumption recession, in particular for borrowers. For large shocks, the
zero-lower bound becomes a constraint to this action.
Our work has contributed to an ongoing literature studying the cause and prop-
agation of the financial crisis by analyzing liquidity shocks in monetary models
which have been frequently used for policy analysis before the crisis. A small
departure from the standard framework is sufficient to produce an interesting
transmission mechanism of the shock and capture macroeconomic behavior and
policy intervention consistent with what economies have experienced.
There are some limitations of our framework which can constitute ground for
further work and analysis. We have abstracted from credit risk and credit events,
which can be also important channels of transmission mechanism of the recent
crisis. However, the research objective of this work is to identify clearly a liq-
uidity shock and liquidity risk as drivers of the macroeconomic adjustment, and
to shed some light on the transmission mechanism of such shock. The sector of
intermediaries is quite rudimentary and could be further elaborated to endog-
enize the creation of pseudo-safe assets. In relation to this point, the degree of
46In an extension of the model presented in Section I with endogenous production and nominal rigidi-
ties, it will be still optimal to lower the interest rate on reserves to offset any impact on consumption
due to the change of the nominal interest rate on bonds.
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acceptance of assets in exchange of goods is exogenous as in Lagos (2010), but the
literature spurred from the latter work has been trying to endogenize it through
differences in the information set on the quality of assets between borrowers and
savers. This might be an important qualification to add to our analysis which
could change some policy implications. In this vein, it could be interesting to
model the exchange of assets for goods through a bargaining process instead of
market equilibrium conditions. These are clearly important issues, which we leave
for future research.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we present the log-linear approximation of the model of Section
I which is used for the analysis of Section II. The first-order approximation is
taken around a deterministic steady state where we can combine equations (11)
and (12) to imply
(A1)
ı¯− ı¯m
1 + ı¯
= (1− γ¯)
[
1− β(1 + ı¯
m)
Π¯
]
in which a bar denotes the steady-state value. A first-order approximation of
equations (11) and (12) around the above steady state delivers
(A2) ıˆt − ıˆmt = −ϑ1Etγˆt+1 + ϑ2Et(rˆt+1 + (pˆit+2 − p¯i)− ıˆmt+1)
where we have defined ıˆt ≡ ln(1 + it)/(1 + ı¯), ıˆmt ≡ ln(1 + imt )/(1 + ı¯m), γˆt+1 =
(γt+1 − γ¯)/(1 − γ¯), pit = lnPt/Pt−1 and the coefficients ϑ1 and ϑ2 are ϑ1 ≡
(¯ı − ı¯m)/(1 + ı¯m) and ϑ2 ≡ 1 − γ¯(1 + ı¯)/(1 + ı¯m). Notice that ϑ1 ≥ 0 and
in particular ϑ1 = 0 when the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding, while
0 ≤ ϑ2 ≤ 1.47.
In equation (A2), rˆt+1 captures the real interest rate that would apply in a
model in which money and bonds are perfect substitutes and is defined as
rˆt+1 = ρEt+1(Yˆt+2 − Yˆt+1)
where ρ ≡ −U¯ccY¯ /U¯c; Yˆt ≡ lnYt/Y¯ . To complete the characterization of the
equilibrium condition through a first-order approximation, we approximate the
cash-in-advance constraint (10) to obtain
(A3) mˆt + sb(bˆt + ϑ3γˆt) = 0
where mˆt represents the log-deviations from the steady state of the ratio of money
over nominal GDP defined as mt ≡ M˜ st−1/(PtYt) where m¯ is its steady-state
value; bˆt is instead the log-deviations from the steady state of the ratio of bonds
over nominal GDP, defined as bt = B˜
s
t−1/(PtYt) with steady-state value b¯, while
ϑ3 ≡ (1− γ¯)/γ¯ and sb ≡ γ¯b¯/m¯. Moreover
(A4) mˆt = mˆt−1 + µmt−1 − pit
47Indeed, equation (A1) implies γ¯(1 + ı¯)/(1 + ı¯m) = γ¯/[γ¯ + (1 − γ¯)Π¯−1β(1 + ı¯m)] ∈ [0, 1], which in
turn implies ϑ2 ∈ [0, 1].
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(A5) bˆt = bˆt−1 + µbt−1 − pit
where µmt and µ
b
t are the rate of growth of money supply and bond supply from
time t−1 to time t. Given exogenous processes {µbt , γˆt} equations (A2), (A3), (A4)
and (A5) determine the path of
{
mˆt, µ
m
t , pit, bˆt, ıˆt, ıˆ
m
t
}
. Accordingly, monetary
policy should specify the path of two instruments of policy.
We describe now some analytical results which are used to produce Figures 1
and 2.
Under the regime in which the monetary policymaker is passive and keeps the
interest rate on reserves and the growth of money constant at the rate followed
before the shock hits, we have that the growth of money is given by
(A6) µ¯m = (1 + sb) p¯i − sbµ¯b.
while the inflation rates vary with the liquidity shock
(A7) pit = p¯i +
sb
1 + sb
ϑ3∆γˆt.
and the path of the interest rate on bonds follows
ıˆt = −ϑ1Etγˆt+1 + ϑ2ϑ3 sb
1 + sb
Et∆γˆt+2.
When the policymaker set inflation rate always at the steady state level of 2% at
annual rate, as shown with the solid line in Figure 1, the path of money growth
follows
(A8) µmt−1 = (1 + sb) p¯i − sb
(
µ¯b + ϑ3∆γˆt
)
.
To keep inflation on target, the growth rate of money supply rises momentarily
when the liquidity properties of bonds deteriorate, and falls to return to the
previous path when liquidity conditions improve. A negative liquidity shock raises
the interest rate on bonds which, under inflation targeting, follows
ıˆt = −ϑ1Etγˆt+1.
When, instead, the policymaker insulates the interest-rate on bonds from the
shock, the interest rate on money follows
ıˆmt = max
(
− ln(1 + ı¯m), ϑ1
∞∑
s=0
ϑs2Etγˆt+1+s
)
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which for the large shock discussed in the text can hit the zero-lower bound.
Appendix B
We solve the model of Section III by taking a first-order approximation around
the initial steady state. The Euler equations of the savers imply
(B1) ıˆdt − ıˆmt = −ϑs1Etγˆt+1 + ϑs2Et(rˆst+1 + (pit+2 − p¯i)− ıˆmt+1)
where we introduce the following additional notation with respect to previous
sections: ıˆdt ≡ ln(1 + idt )/(1 + ı¯d), and the coefficients ϑs1 and ϑs2 are defined as
ϑs1 ≡ (¯ıd − ı¯m)/(1 + ı¯m) and ϑs2 ≡ 1 − γ¯(1 + ı¯d)/(1 + ı¯m). The Euler equation of
the borrowers read in a first-order approximation as
(B2) ıˆbt − ıˆmt = Et(rˆbt+1 + (pit+2 − p¯i)− ıˆmt+1).
In both equations
rˆjt+1 = ρEt+1(Cˆ
j
t+2 − Cˆjt+1)
for each j = b, s where ρ ≡ υY¯ while Y¯ is the steady-state output and we use the
following definitions Cˆjt ≡ (Cjt − C¯j)/Y¯ for each j = b, s.
Appropriately, goods market equilibrium (27) implies in a first-order approxi-
mation that
(B3) Yˆt = χCˆ
s
t + (1− χ)Cˆbt
where now Yˆt = (Yt − Y¯ )/Y¯ .
Finally in a first-order approximation the spread schedule (26) implies
(B4) ıˆbt = ıˆ
d
t + φbˆt
for some parameter φ, where bˆt ≡ (bt − b¯)/Y¯ .
A first-order approximation of the flow budget constraint of the borrowers (43)
implies that
(B5) βbˆt = bˆt−1 + b˜ · ıˆbt−1 − b˜(pit − p¯i) + βCˆbt − βYˆt,
where b˜ ≡ b¯/Y¯ .
Euler equations (B1) and (B2) together with (B3), (B4) and (B5) constitute
the aggregate demand block of the model.
In a log-linear approximation, the supply block comes from approximating (30),
(31) taking into account the definitions of ϕjt for j = b, s. The following modified
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New-Keynesian Phillips curve is obtained
(B6) pit − p¯i = κ(η + ρ)Yˆt + κ[rˆt + Et(pit+1 − p¯i)− ıˆmt ] + βEt(pit+1 − p¯i)
where we have defined κ ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)/α and now
rˆt = ρEt(Yˆt+1 − Yˆt).
The New-Keynesian Phillips curve is augmented by a term reflecting the varia-
tions in the monetary frictions at the aggregate level.
Finally, using the definition mˆjt ≡ (mjt − m¯j)/m¯ for each j = b, s, we take a
first-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions for the money market and
obtain:
(B7)
1
m˜s
mˆst−1 + ıˆ
m
t−1 + ϑ3
(
bˆt−1 + b˜ · ıˆdt−1 + ϑ4γˆt
)
=
1 + ϑ3b˜
c˜s
(
Cˆst + c˜
s(pit − p¯i)
)
(B8)
1
m˜b
mˆbt−1 + ıˆ
m
t−1 =
1
c˜b
Cˆbt + (pit − p¯i),
where we defined m˜j ≡ m¯j/m¯, ϑ3 ≡ γ¯ 1−χχ 1+ı¯
d
1+ı¯m (m˜ · m˜s)−1, m˜ ≡ m¯/Y¯ , ϑ4 ≡
b˜(1− γ¯)/γ¯ and c˜j = C¯j/Y¯ for each j = s, b. Real money balances follow
mˆt ≡ χmˆst + (1− χ)mˆbt(B9)
mˆt = mˆt−1 + µt − pit(B10)
and µt is the nominal money-supply growth.
Equations (B1), (B2), (B3), (B4), (B5) together with (B6), (B7), (B8), (B9),
(B10) and the definitions of rˆst+1, rˆ
b
t+1 and rˆt+1 determine the equilibrium alloca-
tion for pit, Cˆ
b
t , Cˆ
s
t , Yˆt, ıˆ
b
t , ıˆ
d
t , ıˆ
m
t , bˆt, mˆ
s
t , mˆ
b
t , mˆt, µt, where two policy instruments
should be specified.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we show the derivations of the second-order approximation of
the welfare (44). The approximation is taken with respect to an efficient steady
state. This efficient steady state maximizes (44) under the resource constraint
(27) considering that L = (Ls)χ(Lb)1−χ.
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At the efficient steady state the following conditions hold
χ˜U¯ sc = χλ¯;
(1− χ˜)U¯ bc = (1− χ)λ¯;
χ˜V¯ sl = χλ¯
Y¯
L¯s
;
(1− χ˜)V¯ bl = (1− χ)λ¯
Y¯
L¯b
where all upper bars denote steady-state values and λ¯ is the steady-state value
of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (27). Note that the
above conditions imply U¯ sc /U¯
b
c = χ(1 − χ˜)/[(1 − χ)χ˜] so that an appropriately
chosen χ˜ determines the efficient distribution of wealth in a consistent way with
the steady state debt position of the borrowers in the model, given by b¯. For the
above efficient steady-state to be consistent with the steady-state of the model
we need to offset the distortions of the model appropriately. Note that at the
efficient steady state
V¯ jl
U¯ jc
=
Y¯
L¯j
for each j = b, s. On the other side, the steady-state of the model, when inflation
is at the target level, implies
V¯ jl
U¯ jc
=
Y¯
L¯j
W¯
P¯
(1− ϕ¯),
for each j = b, s and
W¯
P¯
=
1
(1− τ)(1 + µ¯) .
where µ¯ ≡ 1/(θ − 1) while
ϕ¯ = 1− β(1 + ı¯
m)
Π¯
.
It is clear from the above equations that we just need to set the employment
subsidy at the level
τ =
µ¯+ ϕ¯
1 + µ¯
in order to make the steady-state of the decentralized allocation efficient.
Having defined the efficient steady state, we take a second-order expansion of
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the utility flow around it to obtain
Ut = U¯+χ˜
[
U¯ sc (C
s
t − C¯s) +
1
2
U¯ scc(C
s
t − C¯s)2
]
+(1−χ˜)
[
U¯ bc (C
b
t − C¯b) +
1
2
U¯ bcc(C
b
t − C¯b)2
]
+
−χ˜
[
V¯ sl (L
s
t − L¯s) +
1
2
V¯ sll (L
s
t − L¯s)2
]
−(1−χ˜)
[
V¯ bl (L
b
t − L¯b) +
1
2
V¯ bll (L
b
t − L¯b)2
]
+O(||ξ||3)
where an upper-bar variable denotes the efficient steady state while O(||ξ||3)
collects terms in the expansion which are of order higher than the second. We
can use the steady-state conditions to write the above equation as
Ut = U¯+χλ¯
[
(Cst − C¯s) +
1
2
U¯ scc
U¯ sc
(Cst − C¯s)2
]
+(1−χ)λ¯
[
(Cbt − C¯b) +
1
2
U¯ bcc
U¯ bc
(Cbt − C¯b)2
]
+
−χλ¯ Y¯
L¯s
[
(Lst − L¯s) +
1
2
V¯ sll
V¯ sl
(Lst − L¯s)2
]
−(1−χ)λ¯ Y¯
L¯b
[
(Lbt − L¯b) +
1
2
V¯ bll
V¯ bl
(Lbt − L¯b)2
]
+O(||ξ||3).
Note that for a generic variable X, we have
Xt = X¯
(
1 + Xˆt +
1
2
Xˆ2t
)
+O(||ξ||3)
where Xˆt ≡ lnXt/X¯ and moreover recall that
Yt = χC
s
t + (1− χ)Cbt ,
implying that
χ(Cst − C¯s) + (1− χ)(Cbt − C¯b) = Y¯
[
Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t
]
+O(||ξ||3)
We can write the above approximation as
(C1) Ut = U¯ + λ¯Y¯
[
Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t
]
− 1
2
λ¯υ
[
χ(Cst − C¯s)2 + (1− χ)(Cbt − C¯b)2
]
− χλ¯Y¯
[
Lˆst +
1
2
(1 + η)(Lˆst )
2
]
− (1− χ)λ¯Y¯
[
Lˆbt +
1
2
(1 + η)(Lˆbt)
2
]
+O(||ξ||3),
where we have also used the fact that with the preference specification used
U¯ scc/U¯
s
c = U¯
b
cc/U¯
b
c = −υ and V¯ sll L¯s/V¯ sl = V¯ bll L¯b/V¯ bl = η.
Note that in equilibrium Lt = ∆tYt where Lt = (L
s)χ(Lb)1−χ. It follows that
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the following condition holds exactly
Yˆt = χLˆ
s
t + (1− χ)Lˆbt + ∆ˆt.
Using the above equation in (C1), the latter can be simplified to
(C2)
Ut − U¯
λ¯Y¯
=
1
2
Yˆ 2t −
1
2
ρ
[
χ(Cˆst )
2 + (1− χ)(Cˆbt )2
]
− 1
2
(1 + η)
[
χ(Lˆst )
2 + (1− χ)(Lˆbt)2
]
− ∆ˆt +O(||ξ||3),
where ρ ≡ υY¯ and we have used the definitions of Cˆst and Cˆbt . Note that to a
first-order approximation
Cˆst = Yˆt − (1− χ)(Cˆbt − Cˆst ) +O(||ξ||2)
Cˆbt = Yˆt + χ(Cˆ
b
t − Cˆst ) +O(||ξ||2)
Lˆst = Yˆt − (1− χ)(Lˆbt − Lˆst ) +O(||ξ||2)
Lˆbt = Yˆt + χ(Lˆ
b
t − Lˆst ) +O(||ξ||2)
which can be used to simplify (C2) to
Ut − U¯
λ¯Y¯
= −1
2
(ρ+η)Yˆ 2t −
1
2
χ(1−χ)ρ(Cˆst−Cˆbt )2−
1
2
χ(1−χ)(1+η)(Lˆst−Lˆbt)2−∆ˆt+O(||ξ||3).
Note that
∆t = α
(
Πt
Π¯
)θ
∆t−1 + (1− α)
1− α (ΠtΠ¯ )θ−1
1− α
 θθ−1
By taking a second-order approximation of ∆ˆt, as it is standard in the literature
and integrating appropriately across time, we obtain that
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆt =
α
(1− α)(1− αβ)θ
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(pit − p¯i)2
2
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
We can then obtain a second-order approximation of the utility of the consumers
as
Wt = −λ¯(η + ρ)Y¯ · 1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0Losst
}
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
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where
Losst = Yˆ
2
t + χ(1− χ)λc(Cˆst − Cˆbt )2 + χ(1− χ)λl(Lˆst − Lˆbt)2 + λpi(pit − p¯i)2
where we have defined
λc ≡ ρ
ρ+ η
λl ≡ 1 + η
ρ+ η
λpi ≡ θ
κ(ρ+ η)
.
Note finally that
(Lst )
1+η
υ exp(−υCst )
=
Wt
Pt
∆tYt(1− ϕst )
(Lbt)
1+η
υ exp(−υCbt )
=
Wt
Pt
∆tYt(1− ϕbt)
which imply in a log-linear approximation that
Lˆst − Lˆbt = −
ρ
1 + η
(Cˆst − Cˆbt )−
ϕ¯
(1− ϕ¯)(1 + η)(ϕˆ
s
t − ϕˆbt)
Moreover from log-linear approximations of (23), we get
ϕˆjt =
1− ϕ¯
ϕ¯
Et
[
(pit+1 − p¯i)− ıˆmt + ρ∆Cˆjt+1
]
for j = b, s and therefore
Lˆst − Lˆbt = −
ρ
1 + η
Et(Cˆ
s
t+1 − Cˆbt+1),
which can be also used in the loss function to replace the term Lˆst − Lˆbt .
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